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Q42Firms buy renewable energy at premiums and report environmental concerns as motivation to do so. The bulk of
the literature on environmental corporate social responsibility suggests that this type of behavior even results in
higher profit. However, a product-differentiation framework with perfect competition predicts that renewable
energy use has no effect on profit. This paper tests this prediction by investigating the relationship between
firms' renewable energy use and profit on the basis of panel data for 920 firms over 2014–2018. We do not
find evidence for an impact of renewable energy use on profit. Hence, a ‘win-win’ in the form of higher profit
and a better environment does not seem to exist. In addition, the results appear to suggest that firms do not
have a positive willingness to pay for renewable energy as contribution to the environment. This implies that
firms are only willing to contribute to climate-change mitigation through buying renewable energy when this
is aligned with the profit-maximization objective.
© 2020 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
An increasing number of firms uses renewable energy with the in-
tention to “combat climate change” (Apple, 2018), “contribut[e] to the
reduction of carbon [emissions]” (Nestle, 2018) or “reduc[e] the
environmental footprint” (Volkswagen, 2017). These public announce-
ments seem to suggest that these firms aremotivated by environmental
concerns when they buy renewable energy, particularly considering
that renewable energy is generally more expensive than non-
renewable energy. For example, in the case of renewable electricity
(applying to the three cited firms), firms that want to claim the use of
renewable electricity typically acquire renewable electricity certificates
in addition to the electricity itself. The wholesale price of European re-
newable electricity certificates (Guarantees of Origin) was approxi-
mately €2 per MWh in 2018 (Greenfact, 2018). Prices of certain
specific certificates are even much higher, such as Dutch wind certifi-
cates, which had a price of more than €7 per MWh in 2018.1
Considering that buying these renewable energy certificates does
not affect at all firms' technological processes, the question emergesation on renewable energy cer-
sale electricity price was about
.V. This is an open access article undhow renewable energy use is related to the general objective of the
firm according to microeconomic theory, which is to maximize profit.
More generally, this question appears relevant for most environmental
corporate social responsibility (CSR) actions of firms. CSR may be re-
ferred to as actions that are beneficial to society, not directly beneficial
to the firm and not required by law (McWilliams and Siegel, 2001). En-
vironmental CSR can be considered the subgroup of CSR actions which
are related to environmental concerns, such as reducing the use of fossil
energy in order to contribute to the mitigation of climate change. This
paper regards renewable energy use as a specific type of environmental
CSR: it benefits society through climate change mitigation while it gen-
erally does not provide direct benefits to thefirm (i.e. lower costs) and is
not required by law.
An extensive amount of papers empirically investigates the impact
of environmental CSR on firm profit, or, comparably, the impact of envi-
ronmental performance on financial performance. While some papers
find no relationship (e.g. Petitjean, 2019; Brzeszczynski, Ghimire,
Jamasb, and McIntosh, 2019), or even a negative impact (e.g.
Oberndorfer, Schmidt, Wagner, and Ziegler, 2013), a large amount of
papers find a positive impact of CSR on profit (e.g. Konar and Cohen,
2001; Kang, Germann, and Grewal, 2016). This positive relationship is
corroborated in several meta-analyses, both for environmental CSR in
particular (e.g. Dixon-Fowler, Slater, Johnson, Ellstrand, and Romi,
2013; Margolis, Elfenbein, and Walsh, 2009) and CSR in general (e.g.
Margolis, Elfenbein, and Walsh, 2009; Margolis and Walsh, 2001;
Orlitzky, Schmidt, and Rynes, 2003). A positive impact of CSR on profiter the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
3 E.g. energy efficiencymeasures. Itmust be noted that it is somewhat doubtfulwhether
these type of production inputs can be considered as CSR because, in addition to external
benefits, they also generate direct private benefits to the firm. This is not the case for re-
newable energy considering that it is generally more expensive than non-renewable
energy.
4 Porter and Van der Linde (1995) also propose that regulation is required for firms to
be willing to invest in many types of CSR because they suggest that firms generally fail
atmaking optimal choices inter-temporally, i.e. fail atminimizing costs/maximizing profit
over the long run.
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the environment are associated with higher firm profit as well.
Taking on a microeconomic perspective, a structural positive effect
of renewable energy use on profit may not be expected. On the one
hand, renewable energy use can enable the firm to differentiate itself
from competitors such that it can serve consumers with a higher will-
ingness to pay (WTP) and charge them higher prices. On the other
hand, competition for those consumers is expected to drive downprices
to the level of marginal costs.2 Furthermore, regarding firms' reported
environmental concerns, it appears questionable as to whether firms
are willing to use renewable energy at the expense of profit, as this di-
rectly contradicts the assumption that firms maximize profit. But if
firmswould bewilling to use renewable energy at the expense of profit,
the decline in profit may be seen as the revealed willingness to pay of
firms to contribute to climate-change mitigation.
The main question we address is: what is the impact of renewable
energy use on firm profit? The main contribution of this paper is that,
to the best of our knowledge, it is the first empirical analysis of the im-
pact of renewable energy use on firm profit. The paper also contributes
to the broader literature on the relationship betweenfinancial and envi-
ronmental performance by using a concrete measure of a specific type
of environmental CSR, instead of the frequently used indicator variables
for environmental CSR (such as the Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini & Co.
(KLD), environmental, social and governance (ESG), or ASSET4 score in-
dicators), of which it is unclear whether they accurately reflect the true
level of environmental performance (e.g. Dixon-Fowler, Slater, Johnson,
Ellstrand, and Romi, 2013).
This paper empirically investigates the impact of renewable energy
use on firm profit. Our analytical framework relies on the theory of
product differentiation in a profit-maximization framework, as
discussed in a seminal paper by Rosen (1974). This framework appears
appropriate since, from a profit-maximization perspective, the only jus-
tification for using renewable energy is that the firm can differentiate it-
self from competitors (e.g. gain a better reputation) and serve
consumers with a higher willingness to pay for this type of product
quality, as renewable energy ismore expensive and provides no techno-
logical advantages. Based on this analytical framework, we expect no
impact of renewable energy use on profit. Our empirical analysis tests
this prediction. If the empirical findings are not in accordance with
this prediction, this might suggest that other explanations for renew-
able energy use by firms aremore appropriate, for instance altruistic en-
vironmental concerns.
The empirical analysis uses panel data for the period 2014–2018.
The panel consists of 920 firms from 59 countries from a very large
number of sectors. Our estimates of the impact of renewable energy
use on firm profit are not statistically significant. These results do not
corroborate the positive impact that has been established in the litera-
ture, and we conclude that there seems to be no ‘win-win’ from renew-
able energy use in the form of higher profit and a better environment.
Instead, the impact appears to be neutral, as predicted by the theoretical
framework, whichwould suggest that firms do not sacrifice profit when
they use renewable energy. However, given that the coefficients are es-
timated with relative imprecision, we recommend further research to
verify these findings.
The remaining of this paper is organized as follows. The second sec-
tion reviews the theoretical and empirical literature. The third section
discusses the analytical framework. The fourth section describes the
methods applied in this paper, in particular the empirical model, data
and estimation method. The fifth section provides the results and dis-
cussion. Section six concludes.2 This may not be true in product-differentiation settings with entry barriers for
selecting/switching between differentiation strategies. In Section 3, the paper argues that
these are not relevant for differentiation on the basis of renewable energy.
2
2. Literature review
A, by now substantial, literature has emerged that discusses the im-
pact of environmental CSR on firm profit. This section first discusses the
link between profit and (environmental) CSR from a theoretical per-
spective. Consequently, this section discusses the findings in the empir-
ical literature. Finally, this section discusses renewable energy use by
firms in particular. Considering the similarity between papers that
focus on the general CSR-profit relationship and the environmental
CSR-profit relationship, this section discusses papers from both the gen-
eral CSR and environmental CSR literature.
2.1. Theoretical literature
Economic theory has suggested two main theoretical explanations
for the presence of (environmental) CSR goods in firms' profit-
maximizing bundle of inputs. First of all, (environmental) CSR can be
part of profit maximization when it enables product differentiation. In
contrast to firms active in markets with homogeneous goods, firms ac-
tive inmarketswith differentiated goodsmay be able to charge a higher
price than competitors (e.g. Rosen, 1974). Taking on a theory of the firm
perspective, McWilliams and Siegel (2001) theorize that CSR expendi-
ture can result in product attributes that are valued by consumers. The
authors propose that firms, like for other inputs, trade-off the costs
and benefits of CSR expenditure and select the quantity of CSR where
the marginal costs and benefits are equalized. Considering the possibil-
ity to switch between CSR strategies, they theorize that CSR does not
have an effect on profit. A primary example of how firms differentiate
themselves from competitors is reputation building through (environ-
mental) CSR expenditure (e.g. Siegel and Vitaliano, 2007; McWilliams
and Siegel, 2011).
Secondly, the profit-maximizing way to produce any quantity is
where the production costs are minimized. Besides that several clean
production technologies or inputs may be cheaper than polluting
alternatives,3 some authors have pointed out more subtle mechanisms
through which environmental CSR can be part of cost-minimization.
Porter and Van der Linde (1995) note thatmany types of environmental
CSR investments are characterized by high initial investment costs
which ultimately lead to cost reductions that offset the initial invest-
ment costs.4 Another argument is that costly environmental CSR may
prevent governments from imposing even more costly regulation (e.g.
Davis, 1973; Carroll and Shabana, 2010).
2.2. Empirical evidence
An extensive empirical literature regarding the impact of environ-
mental CSR in particular or CSR in general and profit has emerged.
Within this empirical literature, two major strands of papers exist. A
first strand tries to relate measures of profit (e.g. net income or return
on assets) to measures of (environmental) CSR (predominantly indica-
tors of environmental CSR based on the KLD, ESG or ASSET4 scores).5 A5 KLD, ESG and ASSET4 scores are typically managed by a research firm. This research
firm scores and ranks other firms on the basis of a set of performance indicators relating
to environmental, social andgovernancematters. Examples of twoperformance indicators
in the KLD database are: (i) whether a company has “…notably strong pollution preven-
tion programs including both emissions reductions and toxic-use reduction programs”;
and (ii) whether a company uses recycled raw materials or is a major factor in the
recycling industry in some other way.
6 For reference, total electricity consumption in 2017 in Chile, Italy and the U.S. was
75TWh, 315TWh and 4098TWh, respectively (IEA, 2019).
7 Althoughmethod (iii) does not involve the explicit purchase of RECs, the opportunity
cost of consuming on-site generated renewable electricity includes the foregoneREC price.
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returns or Tobin's Q) to measures of (environmental) CSR (typically in-
clusion in a sustainability index or indicators of environmental CSR
based on the KLD, ESG or ASSET4 scores). Some paper have used both
measures of profit and measures of stock market performance in their
analysis. With respect to the difference between environmental and
general CSR, papers focusing on the former generally measure CSR
over environmental aspects only, whereas papers focusing on the latter
measure CSR over all aspects. In other respects, themethodology is typ-
ically very similar.
In both strands of literature, the empirical evidence is not fully con-
sistent between studies. For the strand using measures of stock market
performance, a large number of studies finds a positive relationship be-
tween (environmental) CSR and profit (e.g. King and Lenox, 2001; Kang,
Germann, and Grewal, 2016). A considerable number of other studies
find that no relationship exists (e.g. Petitjean, 2019; Brzeszczynski,
Ghimire, Jamasb, andMcIntosh, 2019; Ng and Zheng, 2018). In addition,
a very small minority of studies reports a negative relationship (e.g.
Oberndorfer, Schmidt, Wagner, and Ziegler, 2013; Meznar, Nigh, and
Kwok, 1994). Likewise, for the strand using accounting-basedmeasures
of profit, many studies report a positive relationship (e.g. Russo and
Fouts, 1997; Waddock and Graves, 1997), whereas other studies find
no significant relationship (e.g. Petitjean, 2019). The positive relation-
ship is confirmed by several meta-analyses, which typically include pa-
pers that use profit measures as well as stock market-performance
measures. This is the case for environmental CSR in particular (e.g.
Dixon-Fowler, Slater, Johnson, Ellstrand, and Romi, 2013; Margolis,
Elfenbein, and Walsh, 2009), and for CSR in general (e.g Margolis,
Elfenbein, and Walsh, 2009; Margolis and Walsh, 2001; Orlitzky,
Schmidt, andRynes, 2003). In addition, the type ofmeasure forfirmper-
formance (stock-market or profit based) does not appear to affect these
meta-analytic results (Dixon-Fowler, Slater, Johnson, Ellstrand, and
Romi, 2013).
Barnett and Salomon (2012) theorize and empirically find a U-
shaped relationship between CSR and firm profit. They propose
that, in order to profit from CSR actions, the level of CSR needs to
surpass a certain threshold for otherwise the firm's stakeholders
will not react in a profitable manner. Their argument is based on a
stakeholder argument, namely that a firm's capability to influence
its stakeholders depends on the level of CSR. The paper argues that,
at low levels of CSR, a firm has few abilities to influence its stake-
holders because those stakeholders will not perceive social actions
by the firm as very credible and therefore not respond in a profitable
manner. In contrast, at high levels of CSR, a firm has the ability to in-
fluence its stakeholders because those stakeholders will perceive so-
cial actions by the firm as credible and therefore respond in a
profitable manner (in this case “such actions are in consonance
with the firms character”).
Also related to this paper is Ziegler, Busch, and Hoffmann (2011),
who find that the stock market performance of firms who disclose
their response to climate change is better than the stockmarket perfor-
mance of firms who do not disclose their response.
Many papers in this literature have been criticized for the typical use
of indicator variables for (environmental) CSR, often based on ESG, KLD
and ASSET4 scores. This type of indicator variable is usually based on
ranking firms on a large number of CSR-related aspects. The scores on
the various aspects are then transformed into a single firm-level CSR
score. These indicator variables have mainly become popular because
it is difficult to measure CSR objectively. Inherently, there is a degree
of subjectivity and arbitrariness present in the methodologies underly-
ing such indicators (e.g. selection of aspects and aspect score calcula-
tion). Because of these problems, the validity of these indicators to
represent actual environmental or social performance has been
questioned (e.g. Dixon-Fowler, Slater, Johnson, Ellstrand, and Romi,
2013; Margolis and Walsh, 2001; Chatterji, Levine, and Toffel, 2009;
Semenova and Hassel, 2015). One notable exception is Konar and3
Cohen (2001), who use data regarding emissions of toxic chemicals
and pending environmental lawsuits and also find a positive relation-
ship with profit.
A second critique is thewidespread (incorrect) use of ratio variables
in this literature, both as dependent and independent variable (e.g. re-
turn on assets or toxic chemical emissions per dollar revenue)
(Barnett and Salomon, 2012), which may lead to spurious results in re-
gression analysis (e.g. Kronmal, 1993).
Another branch of papers has verified the direction of causality in
the relationship between profit and CSR. The concern of these papers
is that CSR activities may be determined by profitability, rather than
the other way around, because these activities represent “inessential”
expenditure. If valid and unaccounted for, this reverse causality prob-
lem could lead to biased estimates from conventional estimation tech-
niques. However, explicitly addressing the direction of causality, Kang,
Germann, and Grewal (2016) and Scholtens (2008) find evidence that
causality runs from CSR to profit and not the other way around.
2.3. Renewable energy use by firms
In recent years, there has been a marked increase in the demand for
renewable energy from firms. This can be seen for example from the
steep increase in participation by firms in voluntary renewable energy
programs in which they pledge or articulate their intention to increase
their renewable energy use. Two primary examples are the U.S. EPA's
Green Power Partnership (GPP) program and the RE100 initiative. The
former experienced an increase in the number of participants from
656 in 2006 to 1532 in 2018 (including small, medium and very large
firms from a wide number of sectors). Collectively, participants con-
sumed 55TWh of renewable electricity in 2018 (EPA, 2019).6 The
RE100 initiative experienced an increase from 50 participating firms in
2015 to 155 in 2018 (including mostly large firms from a large number
of sectors) with an aggregate renewable electricity consumption of
72TWh in 2017 (RE100, 2018). Based on survey findings, PWC (2016)
reports that meeting sustainability goals and reducing greenhouse gas
emissions is the primary motivation for firms in the U.S. to buy renew-
able energy.
The primary tool for firms to consume renewable energy is the pro-
curement of renewable energy certificates (RECs), which has become
the dominant market mechanism for consumption of renewable elec-
tricity (Hulshof, Jepma, andMulder, 2019). RECs are administered to re-
newable energy producers, which can then be sold separately from the
energy to end-users who wish to claim the consumption of renewable
energy. Firms buy RECs either (i) directly as unbundled product, i.e. sep-
arately from their electricity product, or (ii) as a bundled product
consisting of both RECs and electricity from a retailer or producer. A
third way to claim the consumption of renewable electricity, which
does not involve the explicit purchase of RECs, is (iii) generating renew-
able electricity on-site at the firm.7 Method (i) and (ii) accounted for
95% and 97% of the renewable electricity consumption of GPP partners
in 2018 and RE100 participants in 2017, respectively (EPA, 2019;
RE100, 2018).
3. Analytical framework
This paper's analytical framework is based on the seminal paper
about vertical product differentiation by Rosen (1974). Products are
vertically (as opposed to horizontally) differentiated when, at a given
price, everybody prefers a product (or is indifferent) when more of a
particular characteristic is present. This appears to be the suitable
framework for our analysis because vertical product differentiation is
Fig. 1. Producer (p) and consumer (θi) reservation prices for the renewable energy
characteristic.
10 Assuming non-constant marginal cost of renewable energymerely changes the shape
of the reservation price curve (e.g. convex), but not the qualitative conclusions regarding
the expected relationship between profit and renewable energy from this theoretical
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to (economic) profit of the firm. It is clear that some individuals prefer
goods with environmental-friendly attributes (e.g. Bjørner, Hansen,
and Russell, 2004) and, despite that some individuals may be indiffer-
ent, there seems to be no reason to dislike the use of renewable energy
in production. This section provides an interpretation of Rosen's model
when goods are vertically differentiated on the basis of firms' renewable
energy usewith several assumptions that are specific to this setting.We
discuss themain insights and implications for the relationship between
firm profit and renewable energy from adopting this framework.
A key element in Rosen's model is the dependence of the market
price (p) on the presence of a number (n) of valuable product character-
istics (z=(z1,z2,⋯,zn)), which he refers to as the hedonic price function
p(z). Here, it is assumed that products are differentiated on the basis of a
single attribute, renewable energy (z = RE). Firms are price takers in
input and output markets, but face different market prices when they
use more or less RE. We will make the specific assumption that firms
can modify the product's renewable energy characteristic by simply
buying the desired amount of renewable energy certificates at the pre-
vailingmarket price, reflecting actual practice. In terms of the firm's cost
function C(M,RE), where M is the quantity produced, this translates to
assuming that themarginal cost of adding renewable energy is constant
i.e. ∂C∂RE > 0 and
∂2C
∂RE2
¼ 0.Moreover, buying renewable energy certificates
does not lead in any way to changes in the physical production process
and there are basically no interactions with other production inputs.8
Further, we assume that firms have the same cost function. While this
may not reflect reality for other product characteristics and inputs, it
can be justified for the case of renewable energy on the basis that
firms do not transform other inputs into the renewable energy charac-
teristic but simply buy it from certificate retailers.
Firms then maximize profit π =Mp(RE) − C(M,RE) with respect to
RE and M. The first order conditions that yield the optimum choices of
M = M ∗ and RE = RE ∗ are given by:











Eq. (2) gives the relationship between profit and renewable energy
use,when evaluated atM ∗. Thefirst term (M ∂p∂RE) gives themarginal rev-
enue of increasing REwhereas the second term ( ∂C∂RE) is themarginal cost
of increasing RE. Notice that the marginal cost of RE per unit of output is
equal to ∂C∂RE =M
∗. This is the firm's minimally required price increase to
be willing to increase its use of RE, i.e. the marginal reservation price
for RE. Because of the assumption that firms have the same cost func-
tion, this is identical for all firms. According to (2), in the optimum,
the marginal cost and revenue per unit should be equal, i.e.
∂p
∂RE ¼ ∂C∂RE =M∗. Furthermore, because we assume a competitive market,
priceswill equal the producers' reservation prices for RE andM. This im-
plies that ∂p∂RE is fully determined by
∂C
∂RE =M
∗.9 Under these assumptions,8 The assumptions on the cost function are chosen to reflect differentiation on the basis
of renewable energy in practice. This includes assuming there exist no entry barriers in the
form of a fixed cost associated with choosing a certain renewable energy/quality level, as
in Shaked and Sutton (1982, 1987). With renewable energy, firms change the desired
amount of certificates and pay the associated marginal certificate price when choosing/
changing the desired quality level instead of paying a significant fixed costs.
9 Individual firms take the hedonic price curve and its slope as exogenous as they are
assumed to be price takers.
4
the hedonic price curve and the producers' common REmarginal reser-
vation price curve coincide and (2) is satisfied at any choice of RE. More-
over, since the marginal cost of certificates is constant, the slope of the
marginal reservation price curve and therefore the hedonic price
curve is also constant. In terms of (2), ∂
2p
∂RE2
¼ 0 because ∂2C
∂RE2
¼ 0 by
assumption.10 Fig. 1 draws the relevant producer reservation price
curve (p(RE)) as a function of the renewable energy characteristic.11
From the perspective of some consumers, more of the renewable en-
ergy inputmay be preferred and thewillingness to pay of these individ-
uals increases with the amount of renewable energy accordingly.
However, since buying a goodwithmore renewable energy (at a higher
price) means lower consumption of other goods, the marginal willing-
ness to pay for the RE characteristic is decreasing, conform the usual
properties of a utility function. In terms of Fig. 1, this can be shown by
introducing a special type of consumer indifference curve, which
Rosen calls the bid curve (θ). The bid curve reflects a consumer's will-
ingness to pay for the good at different RE levels, while holding the
level of utility constant.12 As with conventional indifference curves, a
whole family of parallel bid curves exist. Consumers prefer bundles to
the south-east corner (i.e. a lower price for a given amount of RE) but
are constrained by the market price. Their optimal choice is character-
ized by a tangency condition between their indifference curve and the
hedonic price curve (essentially the budget constraint), corresponding
here to the competitive firm's reservation price curve. Fig. 1 draws the
bid curves of two example consumers, which optimally choose two dif-
ferent levels of RE. When the preferences of consumers for the RE char-
acteristics are very heterogeneous or “spread out”, as is assumed in
Rosen (1974) and here, the points of tangencywith the producer reser-
vation price curve occur at all levels of RE. In other words, at any choice
of RE, a firm can find consumers that prefer exactly that type.
What are the implications for the impact of renewable energy use on
profit? The outcome of the model is that the choice of RE does not mat-
ter for profit as firms are always exactly compensated for the increased
costs of using more renewable energy. By increasing RE, costs increaseframework.
11 Where relevant refers to the reservation price curve corresponding to the
competitive-industry profit level (πpc). Rosen (1974) shows that a whole family of parallel
reservations price curves exist (i.e. all with slope ∂C∂RE =M
∗), each corresponding to a differ-
ent profit level. From assuming a competitive market, the relevant reservation price is the
one associated with πpc.
12 In Figure 1, the vertical axis measures the amount spend on the good, as it is assumed
that consumers buy one unit, which therefore equals the foregone expenditure on other
goods. The bid curve is therefore an inverted conventional indifference curve (trading
off consumption of the good with varying levels of the RE attribute versus consumption
of other goods), with slope equal to the inverse of the slope of a conventional indifference
curve.
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offsettingmanner.13 In otherwords, this theoretical framework predicts
that there is no impact of renewable energy use on profit.14
One of our critical (but arguably realistic) assumptions that drives
this prediction is that firms have access to exactly the same technol-
ogy/cost function to add the renewable energy characteristic, namely
by simply buying the desired amount of certificates at a constant
price. In contrast, assuming differences exist in firms' cost function,
the general model in Rosen (1974) predicts that there will be a single
optimal choice of RE for an individualfirmand deviating in any direction
from the optimumwould hurt profit.
The subsequent empirical analysis tests the prediction of a neutral
impact of renewable energy use on profit,whichwederived from taking
on a profit-maximization perspective with vertical product differentia-
tion in a perfectly competitive environment. Given that alternative ex-
planations for renewable energy use cannot be true at the same time
(e.g. one alternative explanation being that firms engage in green be-
havior for environmental reasons and at the expense of profit), we in-
vestigate the specific explanation that renewable energy use follows
from profit maximization and that firmswill only do so if they are com-
pensated for it (in an offsetting manner due to competition).
4. Method
4.1. Empirical model
Using panel data, we estimate an empirical model that relates firm
profit (π) to renewable energy use (RE). The empirical model assumes
that firms have the cost function C(RE,M(K,L,TE)): firms use capital
(K), labor (L) and (total) energy (use) (TE) to produce the quantity of
output (M), and can adjust the quality of output by procuring RE. We
do not impose structure on the revenue or cost functions. Instead, we
estimate a reduced-form regression model that relates profit to the
four production factors: RE, K, L and TE15:
πti ¼ β0 þ β1REti þ β2Kti þ β3Lti þ β4TEti þ ci þ αY ti þ εti ð3Þ
where t refers to the time period, i to the firm and c to an unobserved
time-invariant firm-specific effect. In this case, c may capture differ-
ences in the unobserved ability of firms' management. Y is a vector of
year-sector interaction dummies which are equal to one for firm i in
year t if the firm belongs to the respective sector and zero otherwise.13 We assume in the model that consumers have perfect information on product quali-
ties in terms of RE. In practice, information about the level of RE is usually not directly ob-
served from a product, but may be accessed through annual or environmental reports.
Suppose that the assumption is violated and information asymmetry regarding RE quali-
ties exists. One would then expect that consumers lower their willingness-to-pay for
products with a positive level of RE and that, as a consequence, adverse selection arises
(cf. Akerlof, 1970). In terms of Figure 1, because of information asymmetry, the consumer
reservation price curves shift to the left. The intrinsic costs of producing RE have not
changed. In effect, the tangency points will shift to the left, resulting in products of rela-
tively lower RE quality and lower average prices (i.e. adverse selection occurs). Regarding
the relationship between profit and renewable energy use, information asymmetry has no
effect because it is still predicted to be neutral.
14 From assuming there is perfect competition between firms at every level of RE, this
theoretical framework implies that there exist few incentives to switch from RE strategy.
However, our theoretical framework describes an equilibrium outcome and transition dy-
namicsmay partly explain the incentives forfirms to switch fromRE strategy. Consider, for
example, that consumer preferences change towards preferring more green types. This
change may create new niche markets that previously did not exist. First movers in these
new niche markets may earn profit in the short run, providing an explanation for why
firms may switch from RE strategy. With perfect competition and considering how easy
it is to switch to/copy another RE strategy, these profit opportunities are expected to dis-
sipate relatively quickly.”
15 The empirical model implicitly assumes that the relationship between renewable en-
ergy use and profit, as given by β1, is the same for all firm sizes. This is in linewith our the-
oretical framework. However, we have also estimated equation (3) with interactions
included between RE and K, L and TE (separately) to investigate whether the marginal ef-
fect of renewable energy use differs with firm size. These interaction terms (and β1) are
not statistically significant in all three robustness estimations.
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This may capture for example macroeconomic fluctuations pertaining
to a specific sector. ε is an error term which is assumed to be indepen-
dent and identically distributed with a mean of zero.
To test for the presence of a U-shaped relationship betweenπ andRE,
as found by Barnett and Salomon (2012), we estimate a second specifi-
cation that includes a quadratic RE term:
πti ¼ β0 þ β1REti þ β11RE2ti þ β2Kti þ β3Lti þ β4TEti þ ci þ αY ti þ εti ð4Þ
The empirical models deliberately omit R&D expenditure as control
variable, which is suggested to be included by McWilliams and Siegel
(2000) for empirical models linking CSR to profit. As the procurement
of RECs from producers or retailers is a simple administrative act, re-
newable energy consumption is typically not expected to be relevant
for firms' product innovations stemming fromR&D expenditure. Includ-
ing R&D expenditure does notmaterially change our conclusion regard-
ing the impact of renewable energy use on profit. The first two columns
of Table A.1 in Appendix A report the results of the model with R&D ex-
penditure included as control variable. Another control variable that has
often been included in the CSR literature that we omit is the level of
debt. Including debt also does not materially change our conclusions,
see the last two columns of Table A.1 in Appendix A.
4.2. Data
The data for this analysis comes from firms' financial and environ-
mental reports over the period 2014–2018, which we collect using
Bloomberg. For this period, renewable energy use (in GWh) is reported
for 973 firms in one ormore years, resulting in a total number of annual
firm-year observations for this variable of 2702 (including observations
of zero renewable energy use).16 The data on renewable energy use is
complemented with data for the other variables in (3): net income (in
thousandUS$) as ameasure of profit,17 total energy use (in GWh),18 as-
sets (in million US$) as a measure of capital and the number of em-
ployees (in full-time equivalents) as a measure of labor.
The final panel dataset is unbalanced due to one ormoremissing ob-
servations in most of the variables. In total, the final sample includes
2554 firm-year observations for 911 firms. Firms from all continents
and sectors are included in the sample, where sectors are distinguished
according to the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) by FTSE Rus-
sell. The ICB classification encompasses 114 sub-sectors, 41 sectors, 19
super-sectors and 10 industries, out of which 104, 39, 19 and 10 are rep-
resented in the sample. The ICB sectors are used for construction of the
year-sector dummy variables (195 in total of which one is omitted in
the estimations). Table 1 reports details about the geographical and in-
dustrial characteristics of the firms in our sample. Table 2 reports sev-
eral key descriptive statistics of the variables.
Reporting about renewable energy use is voluntary and the incen-
tive to report seems more obvious for firms that use considerable
amounts of renewable energy (i.e. green firms) than for firms that do
not. Therefore, a worry may be that the sample only includes relatively
greenfirms, thereby introducing a potential selection bias. However, the
kernel density plot of the distribution of the share of renewable energy
(as percentage of total energy use) depicted in Fig. 2 in Appendix B
shows that the large majority of the firm-years in the sample have a re-
newable energy share of or close to zero. Our results could still be prone
to selection bias when these zero observations are ‘early’ observations
of firms who start reporting positive renewable energy use in later
time periods. However, 46% of the ‘zero’ observations for renewable16 Note that this includes all types of renewable energy, such as renewable electricity, re-
newable gas, renewable hydrogen etc.
17 I.e. after taxes, interest payments, depreciation and all other expenses. Note that this is
a measure of accounting profit and not economic profit.
18 Including all types of energy.
Table 1
Number of firm-years in sample by geography and industry.
World North America South America Europe Africa Asia Oceania
All sectors 2554 608 177 1071 35 604 59
Oil & gas 88 21 9 33 0 25 0
Basic materials 316 84 35 93 5 81 18
Industrials 551 108 27 246 5 154 11
Consumer goods 429 74 26 181 9 135 4
Health care 124 46 3 47 2 26 0
Consumer services 180 51 8 92 10 19 0
Telecommunications 96 10 11 56 1 13 5
Utilities 135 24 46 51 0 14 0
Financials 458 115 12 246 3 61 21




Mean SD (within) Minimum Maximum
Net income (mln US$) 1300 3939 (2235) −16,265 94,209
Renewable energy use
(GWh)
1423 5930 (1935) 0 106,884
Total energy use (GWh) 10,672 37,656 (4788) 0.2 563,957
Share of renewable energy 18.0% 24.8% (6.9%) 0% 100%
Assets (mln US$) 79,653 259,548
(18,998)
22 2,622,532
Employees (fte) 45,795 73,836 (8104) 5 706,730
Source: Bloomberg.
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newable energy use in the observed period.20 In our discussion of potential caveats in the conclusion, we particularly consider the
threat that reverse causality poses to interpreting the coefficient of renewable energy as
causal effect.
21 It depends on the perspective whether €11 sacrifice in profit perMWh should be con-
sidered as substantial. Compared to thewholesale price of electricity (approximately €45/4.3. Estimation method
The analysis applies both a within-estimation procedure as well as a
random-effects estimation procedure to estimate the coefficients of
Eqs. (3) and (4). A within-estimation procedure is appropriate when
the unobserved time-invariant firm-specific effect (c) is correlated
with the independent variables, which is not unlikely. A drawback of
using thewithin-estimator is that it only exploits variation in renewable
energy use within firms, of which there is considerably less when com-
pared to variation between firms (see Table 2). Therefore, we also apply
a random-effects estimation procedure, which exploits both sources of
variation. The random-effects estimator has the additional benefit
that, in contrast to using within-firm variation only, using also
between-firm variation in our static panel-data model means that
lagged effects on profit from renewable energy use are not neglected.
This could be relevant when, for instance, reputation improvements
from renewable energy use, and therefore the ability to charge higher
prices, do not fully materialize instantly but take some time. The draw-
back of the random-effects model is that, because c is not explicitly
modeled, unbiasedness of the estimates relies on the assumption that
c is uncorrelated with firm profitability and the independent variables.
We have tested for this assumption using the test proposed by
Wooldridge (2010).19 This test fails to reject that the firm-specific effect
is uncorrelatedwith the other independent variables, providing support
for the appropriateness of applying a random-effects estimation
procedure.
To test for the presence of a linear relationship between profit and
renewable energy use, we estimate themodel in Eq. (3) and test the hy-
pothesis that β1 = 0 against the alternative that β1 ≠ 0. To test for the19 In this case, the test ofWooldridge (2010) ismore appropriate than themore conven-
tionally applied Hausman test because the latter cannot accommodate the model's year-
sector interactions and is not valid when the model suffers from heteroskedasticity.
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presence of U-shaped relationship, we estimate Eq. (4) and apply the
test proposed by Lind and Mehlum (2010). Their formal test provides
the necessary and sufficient conditions for the presence of a
(n) (inverse-)U shape. The test entails testing the null hypothesis that
a monotone or inverse-U shape (U shape) is present versus the alterna-
tive that a U shape (inverse-U shape) is present. We refer to their paper
for the details of the test procedure.
Cluster-robust standard errors are computed because the autocorre-
lation test as proposed byWooldridge (2010) indicates the presence of
autocorrelation. In addition, from residual plots, it appears as if the pre-
dicted values become less accurate when the predicted value becomes
larger, i.e. the models seem to suffer from heteroskedasticity. The stan-
dard errors are clustered at the level of the sub-sector based on the ICB
classification (104 clusters).5. Results and discussion
5.1. Results
Table 3 reports the estimation results. The estimated coefficient for
renewable energy use is interpreted as the change in profit in US$ per
MWh-change in renewable energy use. The first two columns report
the results of a reduced model with only renewable energy as indepen-
dent variable. The estimated coefficients for renewable energy use are
negative, but not statistically significant.
The third and fourth column report our main results based on esti-
mating Eq. (3) with a within-estimation and random-effects estimation
procedure, respectively. By controlling for the other key variables, the
interpretation of the estimated coefficient for renewable energy
moves in the direction of a causal effect.20 The estimated coefficient
for renewable energy use in both models are negative and highly non-
significant (p=0.554 in the fixed-effects and p=0.938 in the random-
effects model). The key point estimates for the coefficient of renewable
energy use are −10.78 from the fixed-effects model, and − 0.77 from
the random-effects model. Taken at face value, the first coefficient sug-
gests a negative effect on profit of €11 per MWh increase in RE use
within a firm, and the second coefficient suggest an effect on profit of al-
most zero per MWh increase in RE use.21 However, considering the re-
spective 95% confidence intervals of [−46.67, 25.21] and [−20.32,
18.77], these key coefficients are not estimated with a high degree ofMWh in the past decade in Europe) or the certificate price (ranging from €2–€8 in Europe
in 2018), this appears substantial. Considering themean firm in the sample, however, this
result translates to a decrease in profit of €11/MWh × 1432GWh = €15.5 mln on a total
profit of €1132 mln.
Table 3
Estimation results. Dependent variable: net income (x1000 US$).
Key var. only Linear specification Quadratic specification
Fixed effects Random effects Fixed effects Random effects Fixed effects Random effects
Renewable energy use (GWh) −12.90 −8.20 −10.78 −0.77 −100.75 9.55
(0.373) (0.323) (0.554) (0.938) (0.287) (0.751)
(Renewable energy use)2 0.001 −0.0001
(0.294) (0.620)
Assets (mln US$) 15.45* 6.05*** 15.57* 6.05***
(0.089) (0.000) (0.088) (0.000)
Labor (fte) −4.51 10.74*** −4.26 10.72***
(0.625) (0.000) (0.644) (0.000)
Total energy use (GWh) 0.58 3.92* 2.45 3.69
(0.953) (0.076) (0.808) (0.119)
Constant 1,293,553*** 1,187,219*** 737,110 935,284*** 184,756 939,322***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.276) (0.000) (0.785) (0.000)
Pseudo R2 0.0001 0.0002 0.23 0.32 0.23 0.32
No. of observations 2700 2700 2554 2554 2554 2554
No. of firms 972 972 911 911 911 911
Year-sector dummies+ No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
P-value in parentheses. * p < 0.1, *** p < 0.001. + year-sector dummies are equal to one for firm i in year t if the firm belongs to sector s and zero otherwise.
Table 4
Robustness-estimation results. Dependent variable: net income (x1000 US$).










Energy & utilities sector −2.57 −20.52
(0.654) (0.118)
Basic materials sector −143.81 −4.75
(0.168) (0.625)
Industrial sector 262.55*** −64.68
(0.000) (0.506)
Consumer goods sector −70.48 −46.70*
(0.22) (0.068)
Health care sector −6137.53 1081.5
(0.299) (0.100)






Financial sector −38.85 28.12
(0.168) (0.397)














Assets 14.38 5.19*** 14.32 5.33***
(0.107) (0.000) (0.104) (0.000)
Labor −3.83 9.99*** −4.21 10.7***
(0.679) (0.000) (0.647) (0.000)
Total energy use −3.18 4.49** −9.3** 3.68**
(0.581) (0.015) (0.01) (0.025)
Constant 759,132 245,094 944,403 245,704
(0.301) (0.107) (0.195) (0.118)
Pseudo R2 0.08 0.33 0.08 0.25
No. of observations 2554 2554 2554 2554
No. of firms 911 911 911 911
Year-sector dummies+ Yes Yes Yes Yes
P-value in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. + year-sector dummies are
equal to one for firm i in year t if the firm belongs to sector s and zero otherwise.
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small to detect.
In comparison with the meta-analytic results of e.g. Margolis,
Elfenbein, and Walsh (2009) and Dixon-Fowler, Slater, Johnson,
Ellstrand, and Romi (2013), the negative and non-significant coeffi-
cients do not provide support for the positive relationship between
profit and renewable energy use. Instead, the absence of a statistically
significant effect of renewable energy use on profit and the point
estimate from the random-effects model provide support for a
non-existent impact of renewable energy use on profit. This is in
line with the predicted relationship based on the adopted product-
differentiation framework with profit-maximizing firms. We do not
find evidence for a ‘win-win’ in the form of a better environment and
higher firm profit. The negative coefficient from the fixed-effects esti-
mation could be interpreted as support for the notion that firms are
sacrificing profit in favor of renewable energy use, although it is not sta-
tistically significantly different from zero. In addition, the lower coeffi-
cient estimated with the fixed-effects estimator, as compared to the
random-effects estimator, may be partly explained by the existence of
lagged positive effects of renewable energy use on revenue.
Columns five and six of Table 3 report the estimation results for the
quadratic model in Eq. (4) using a fixed-effects and random-effects es-
timator, respectively. In the fixed-effects model, the estimated coeffi-
cients for renewable energy and its square have the required signs for
a U-shaped relationship with profit, but are not statistically significant.
In addition, the formal test for a U shape fails to reject the null-
hypothesis at conventional significance thresholds (p-value 0.151). In
contrast, in the random-effects model, the estimated coefficients point
to a potential inverse-U-shaped relationship. However, both the statisti-
cal non-significance of the coefficients as well rejection by the formal
test (p-value 0.376) do not provide evidence for the presence of an
inverse-U shape. These results do not corroborate the U-shaped rela-
tionship between CSR and profit that Barnett and Salomon (2012) find.
With respect to the other variables, conform expectation, the coeffi-
cients for assets, labor and total energy use are positive and significant
in the random-effects model. In the fixed-effects model, the coefficient
for assets is conform expectation. However, the coefficient for labor is
negative and not statistically significant and the coefficient for total en-
ergy use is positive and not statistically significant. While we expect
positive coefficients for all three productive inputs, we may not be
able to statistically detect these simultaneously in the fixed-effects
model when the usage of the three productive inputs within a firm is
strongly correlated over time. This is less problematic in the random-7
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productive inputs between firms than within firms (see Table 2). The
estimated coefficients for the firm and year-sector fixed effects are not
reported to facilitate readability and because they are of limited interest.
5.2. Exploring sectoral and geographical patterns
Given the large degree of heterogeneity in industry and geography
across firms in the sample, this subsection investigates potential differ-
ences between industries and continents in the renewable energy use-
profit association. To that end, we estimate models based on Eq. (3)
that include interactions between industry and renewable energy use,
and interactions between continent and renewable energy use.
Table 4 reports the results of these estimations.
The first and second column of Table 4 report the results of the ex-
ploratory model with interactions between renewable energy use and
industries, estimatedwith a fixed-effects and random-effects model, re-
spectively. The following industries are included (classified on the basis
of the ICB industries): energy & utilities, industrials, health care, tele-
communications, consumer services, consumer goods, financials, and
technology. Bothmodels do not appear to suggest a large degree of het-
erogeneity between industries in the profit-renewable energy link, con-
sidering that most of the industry-specific coefficients for renewable
energy use are not statistically significant. In the fixed-effects model,
the only industry that has a statistically significant coefficient is the in-
dustrials sector, which has a positive coefficient. In contrast, in the
random-effects model, we estimate a negative and statistically signifi-
cant coefficient for the consumer goods sector, and a positive and statis-
tically significant coefficient for the technology sector. Principally, the
adopted theoretical framework in this paper and the resulting predic-
tion that the effect of renewable energy use on profit is neutral are ge-
neric and apply (ceteris paribus) to all industries. We have not further
analyzed these results, and providing explanations would be
speculative.
Columns three and four of Table 4 report the results of the explor-
atory model with interactions between renewable energy use and con-
tinents, estimated with a fixed-effects and random effects model,
respectively. From both models, we do not find large differences in the
profit-renewable energy use association between continents, given
thatfive out of six continent-specific coefficients are not statistically sig-
nificant. The estimates in the fixed-effects model suggests that renew-
able energy use is only associated to a (positive) change in profit for
Oceanian firms. In contrast, in the random-effects model, we estimate
a statistically significant, negative coefficient for Asian firms.
6. Conclusion
Firms buy renewable energy at premiums and typically report envi-
ronmental concern asmotivation to do so. The empirical environmental
CSR literature suggests that there even exists a ‘win-win’ from this type
of firm behavior: more environmental CSR is associated with higher
profit levels.
From a microeconomic perspective, however, higher profit from re-
newable energy use in particular, and environmental CSR in general, is
typically not expected. On the one hand, firms may be able to differen-
tiate themselves from competitors by using renewable energy and
thereby charge higher prices. On the other hand, competition for
those high-WTP consumers drives down prices towards the level of
marginal costs. In addition, if we assume that the objective of the firm
is to maximize profit, there is no scope for renewable energy use at
the expense of profit. Therefore, in this profit-maximization framework,
we expect that there is no effect from renewable energy use on profit.
This paper has analyzed the relationship between renewable energy
use and firm profit. In particular, we have tested the prediction that
there is no impact of renewable energy use on firm profit, using panel8
data for 920 firms from various regions and sectors over the period
2014–2018. In this panel, alsofirms that use no or hardly any renewable
energy are strongly represented in the sample.
The results suggest that there is no impact from renewable energy
use on profit. The interpretation of this results is twofold. Firstly, our re-
sults do not imply that a ‘win-win’ relationship between renewable en-
ergy use and profit exists. In other words, promoting social goals (a
better environment) does not appear to be associatedwith higher profit.
This is different from themeta-analytic results of the environmental CSR
literature, which have established such a ‘win-win’ relationship. Sec-
ondly, the results alsoappear to imply thatfirmsarenot sacrificingprofit
when they use renewable energy, which could have been an indication
for a positive willingness to pay for the environment by firms. These
findings are in line with the expected relationship between renewable
energy use and profit from the adopted framework of product-
differentiation by profit-maximizing firms. However, in one model, we
estimate a coefficient that is statistically not significant but, in terms of
effect size, relatively close to the price of (European) RECs. Therefore,
we recommend further research to verify this paper's findings.
The results appear to indicate that firms do not have objectives be-
yond maximizing profit, and that firms are only willing to contribute
to climate changemitigation through the purchase of renewable energy
when this contributes to the profit-maximization objective as well. For
government policy, this would imply that policies should affectfirms' fi-
nancial incentives in order to induce changes in behavior. This can be
done, for instance, by affecting revenues (e.g. reducing information
asymmetry in markets for green types which may raise consumer
WTP) or costs (e.g. by introducing taxes on polluting inputs or subsidies
for non-polluting alternatives).
This paper's main contribution is that it is the first to explicitly study
the relationship between renewable energy use and profit. In addition,
in relation to the broader environmental CSR literature, this paper
uses a specific and concrete measure of environmental CSR in the
form of renewable energy use, rather than an indicator variable of
which it is not clear to what extent it represents actual environmental
performance.
Several caveats of the current study need to be mentioned. First, on
the basis of foundations of the microeconomic theory of the firm, such
as profit maximization and product differentiation, this paper theorizes
and empirically postulates that causality runs from renewable energy
use to profit. We have not controlled for a potentially reverse relation-
ship in which profit causes changes in renewable energy use, as this is
highly complicated by the unavailability of data for truly exogenous in-
struments for renewable energy use. A reverse causal relationship
might result from adopting other theoretical perspectives (e.g. agency
theory). While the existing empirical evidence currently does not ap-
pear to support a causal relationship from CSR to profit (Kang,
Germann, and Grewal, 2016; Scholtens, 2008), if the true relationship
is of this kind, this paper's estimation results may suffer from an
endogeneity bias. Secondly, considering the considerable standard er-
rors, the key regression coefficients are not highly precise. As a result,
we cannot conclusively distinguish between an effect of renewable en-
ergy use on profit that is zero or relatively small. Thirdly, the empirical
analysis uses net income as measure for profit. This is a measure of ac-
counting profit, whereas the theory concerns the relationship between
economic profit and renewable energy use. To verify the findings of
this paper and because firms increasingly play an important contribu-
tion in societies' efforts to mitigate climate change, further research re-
garding the link between firms' environmental contributions and
financial objectives is required.
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ment No. 691797Appendix ATable A.1
Estimation results of alternative specifications including R&D expenditure (first two columns) and debt (last two columns) as control variables.Model incl. R&D exp. Model incl. DebtFixed effects Random effects Fixed effects Random effectsE −14.83 0.52 −10.39 −0.81
(0.468) (0.949) (0.877) (0.935)
56.79** 16.95* 20.03** 6.13***
(0.048) (0.088) (0.03) (0.000)
−15.30 1.90 −4.01 10.74***
(0.193) (0.505) (0.955) (0.000)E 2.58 1.15 0.23 3.94*
(0.653) (0.751) (0.981) (0.079)&D −55.92 995.05***
(0.907) (0.001)ebt −22.17* −0.35
(0.081) (0.951)onstant 790,027.3 705,224.6*** 871,787.2 936,025.5***
(0.172) (0.000) (0.208) (0.000)seudo R2 0.28 0.41 0.24 0.32
o. of obs. 2098 2098 2554 2554
o. of firms 765 765 911 911
ear-sector
ummies+ Yes Yes Yes YesdP-value in parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
+ year-sector dummies are equal to one for firm i in year t if the firm belongs to sector s
and zero otherwise.Appendix B
Fig. 2. Kernel density plot of the share of renewable energy use in total energy use of the firm-years in the sampleReferences
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